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CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS WITH RESPECT TO PRIMA FACIE

ROBINSON-PATMAN VIOLATIONS
Jerrold G. Van Cise*
I. Introduction
When Professor Higgins initially met Eliza Doolittle in the delightful musical comedy My Fair Lady, he found her English to be poor and her manners
to be worse. You will recall, however, that eventually he transformed Eliza into
a lady of lovely speech and loving ways.
When the courts and the Federal Trade Commission first met the Robinson-Patman Act in legal proceedings which at times verged upon comedy, they
similarly found this legislation difficult to understand and even more difficult
to live with. It is therefore a pleasure to report that a real life parallel to Eliza
seems to be emerging currently. The administrators of the act appear recently
to have made great progress in remaking the statute into commands of reasonable
clarity and workable content.'
Three developments in particular, involving what constitute a prima facie
violation of the act, are illustrative of this encouraging change. These events
relate to (1) like grade and quality, (2) injury to competition and (3) buyer

liability.
II. Like Grade and Quality
By the enactment of the Robinson-Patman Act, American industry was
instructed that "discrimination" in price in the sale of commodities of "like
grade and quality" 2 was prohibited in certain circumstances. However, businessmen were not informed whether any, or only some, difference in price would
constitute such a "discrimination" or whether any, or only some, difference in

a commodity would cause it to be "unlike."

The courts and the FTC subsequently ruled that any difference in price
Member, New York Bar; B.S., Princeton University, 1932; LL.B., Yale Law School,
1935; former Chairman, Section of Antitrust Law, American Bar Association; partner,
Cahill, Gordon, Reindel & Ohl, New York, New York. Mr. Van Cise is the author of The
Federal Antitrust Laws '(1965), Understanding the Antitrust Laws (1963) and How To
Comply With the Antitrust Laws (1953), as well as numerous articles on antitrust law.
1 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1964).
2 Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act provides in pertinent part:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of
such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different
purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, where either or any of the purchases involved in such discrimination are in commerce, where such commodities are
sold for use, consumption, or resale within the United States or any Territory thereof
or the District of Columbia or any insular possession or other place under the jurisdiction of the United States, and where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce,
or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants or
knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of
them: Provided, That nothing herein contained shall prevent differentials which make
only due allowance for differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from the differing methods or quantities in which such commodities are to such
purchasers sold or delivered....
49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1964);,
*
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constituted a "discrimination," ' but that only a substantial difference in a
commodity caused it to be "unlike." 4 Three recent Commission decisions with
respect to distinctions in grade and quality have now clarified what differences
will be deemed substantial.
In accordance with prior precedents, 5 the Commission has declared that
goods bearing a private brand were not so "unlike" identical goods carrying6
an advertised label that the former may be priced independently of the latter.
The Commission emphasized that any price difference between unadvertised
and advertised brands must be justified in accordance with the legal principles
applicable to any other price discrimination under the act, e.g., by differences
in cost arising from differing methods or quantities of sale or delivery. When
the Fifth Circuit differed with this reasonable interpretation, the FTC induced
the Solicitor General to appeal the issue to the Supreme Court for a definitive
7
ruling.
On the other hand, where the grade of a product was sufficiently inferior
in structure and composition to be appreciably less attractive in buyer appeal,

the FTC has ruled in two industry settings that it was "unlike" the standard
variety of this commodity and may lawfully be priced lower than the better
quality or grade of the product.' An unpublished study, undertaken by leading
economists as part of the private compliance program of a major corporation,
substantially concurs with these Commission conclusions.
These rulings make it clear to industry that, although the parties should
be aware of the Robinson-Patman Act when they sell or buy at different prices,
they nevertheless will be relatively safe from its prohibitions if any such differences in prices merely reflect and are ancillary to substantial differences in
the content and utility of the commodities involved. Reasonable men could
not ask for more practical guidelines.
III. Injury to Competition
American industry was further informed by the Robinson-Patman Act
that any discrimination in price between like commodities is forbidden where
its effect "may be" substantially to lessen, injure, destroy or prevent competition
or tend to create a monopoly.9 Businessmen were left in doubt, however, as to
what set of facts will give rise to the proscribed effect.
3 FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536 (1960), reversing 265 F.2d 677 (7th Cir.
1959).
4 Central Ice Cream Co. v. Goldenrod Ice Cream Co., 287 F.2d 265 (7th Cir.) cert. denied, 368 U.S. 829 (1961); General Shale Prods. Corp. v. Struck Constr. Co., 132 F.2d 425
(6th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 780 (1943); County Theatre Co. v. Paramount Film
Distrib. Corp., 146 F. Supp. 933 (E.D. Pa. 1956). Cf. Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can
Co., 87 F. Supp. 985 (S.D. Fla. 1949), aff'd, 187 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1951).
5 Hartley & Parker, Inc. v. Florida Beverage Corp., 307 F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1962); United
States Rubber Co., 46 F.T.C. 998 (1950); United States Rubber Co., 28 F.T.C. 1489 (1939);
Hansen Inoculator Co., 26 F.T.C. 303 (1938).
6 Borden Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 116191 (F.T.C. No. 28, 1962).
7 Borden Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. granted, 382 U.S. 807 '(1965).
8 Quaker Oats Co., 3 TRADE REo. REP. 17134 (F.T.C. Nov. 18, 1964) ; Universal Rundle
Corp., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 116948 (F.T.C. June 12, 1964).
9 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1964).
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The courts and the FTC have collaborated in bringing order out of this
confused phraseology. In a recent series of rulings, they have explained that
the act will apply only upon a showing of a substantial threat to competition
between sellers or between buyers, and once again they have explained what they
mean by substantial."
The courts in early rulings emphasized that the effect of a discrimination
"may be" substantially to restrain competition among sellers (i.e., at the primary level) when a seller institutes a territorial price cut for the deliberate
purpose of injuring local competitors." Two new opinions of the Commission
have now made clear that this effect may also occur when a seller- regardless
of his purpose - maintains a territorial price discrimination over a substantial
period of time at a level which not only undercuts the prices of local competitors
but in addition goes below the point at which these local competitors can operate
profitably. 2 Both courts and the Commission have stressed, however, that territorial price cutting is not per se unlawful," and that even systematic price
cutting is not to be viewed -

without more -

as a threat to competition at the

seller level. 4
Again, the courts have ruled that the effect of a discrimination "may be"
to restrain competition between buyers (i.e., at the secondary level) when a
seller grants a substantial price discrimination over an appreciable period of
time to a favored buyer and this discrimination is shown to have some direct,
causal relationship injurious to the profits or sales of competing buyers." Here
also the courts, and now the Commission, have emphasized that a discrimination in price even between competing buyers is not considered to be per se
unlawful without some showing of probable competitive injury,'" and that the
probability of such an adverse effect will be most difficult to establish if the
price discrimination is of short duration.'
These rulings reassure industry that even where the Robinson-Patman Act
10 American Oil Co. v FTC, 325 F.2d 101 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 954
(1964); Whitaker Cable Corp. v. FTC, 239 F.2d 253 (7th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S.
938 (1957).
11 Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115 (1954) ; Maryland Baking Co. v. FTC,
243 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1957); E. B. Muller & Co. v. FTC, 142 F.2d 511 (6th Cir. 1944); Porto
Rican American Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 30 F.2d 234 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
279 U.S. 858 (1929).
12 Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 117303 (F.T.C. July 23, 1965); Forster
Mfg. Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 16243 (F.T.C. Jan. 3, 1963), vacated and remanded, 335 F.2d
47 '(lst Cir. 1964), opinion on remand, 3 TRADE REG. REP. 1 17304 (F.T.C. July 23, 1965);
accord, Volasco Prods. Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 346 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1965).
13 Forster Mfg. Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 17304 (F.T.C. July 23, 1965) (Elman, Comm'r,
concurring).
14 Moore Business Forms, Inc., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 1 16889 (F.T.C. April 30, 1964);
Uarco, Inc., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 1 16807 (F.T.C. Feb. 24, 1964).
15 FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 43 (1948); accord, United Biscuit Co. of America v. FTC, 350 F.2d 615 (7th Cir. 1965); C. E.Niehoff & Co. v. FTC, 241 F.2d 37 (7th Cir.
1957), vacated and remanded, 355 U.S. 411, cert. denied, 355 U.S. 941 (1958); Moog Indus.
v. FTC, 238 F.2d 43 (8th Cir. 1956), aff'd, 355 U.S. 411 (1958); P. & D. Mfg. Co., 52 F.T.C.
1155 (1956), aff'd, 245 F.2d 281 (7th Cir.),-cert. denied, 355 U.S. 884 (1957).
16 Borden Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 953 (7th Cir. 1964); Admiral Corp., 3 TRADE REQ. REP.
117230 (F.T.C. April 7, 1965); W. F. Schrafft & Sons, 3 TRADE REG. REP. 16882 (F.T.C.
April 22, 1964).
17 American Oil Co. v. FTC, 325 F.2d 101 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 954
(1964); Humble Oil & Refining Co., 3 TRADE REo. R.E. 1 17259 (F.T.C. June 8, 1965);
Sperry Rand Corp., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 16791 '(F.T.C. Feb. 17, 1964).
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applies to a discrimination in price between like commodities, it does not require
any rigid, public utility type of pricing. The confused, individualistic phraseology of the act thereby has in large part been reconciled with the competitive
philosophy of our other antitrust laws, and it should now be possible for businessmen to comply more readily with the former legislation without almost
inevitably appearing to violate the latter.
IV. Buyer Liability
American industry was also informed by the Robinson-Patman Act that
liability for a proscribed price discrimination will vary depending upon whether
the seller or buyer is being charged with the alleged unlawful conduct. Sellers
who discriminate in price in the forbidden manner are declared to be guilty
of a prima facie violation,' but this is not true of buyers. Buyers must also be
shown to have "knowingly" induced or received the prohibited discrimination
to be prima facie in violation of the statute. " This condition precedent to buyer
liability was also left for future clarification by the courts and the Commission.
The early decisions held that it was not sufficient to show merely that a
buyer "knowingly" received a price which was different from that made available to others. 0 But the courts and the FTC have since ruled that a buyer
who induces a prohibited discrimination by conduct indicating either his awareness of, or indifference to its illegality is "knowingly" obtaining an unlawful
discrimination. They have declared that vendees may not set up corporate
buying offices controlled by them and by this subterfuge obtain any functional
discounts resulting in lower net prices to them than to their competitors. 2' Moreover, the Commission has declared that a buyer who deliberately seeks preferential treatment " or misleads a seller into giving the buyer a lower price in order
to meet a nonexistent low competitive quotation "3 is "knowingly" inducing an
unlawful discrimination. The Commission has finally awakened to the fact that
compliance with this legislation will be possible only when proceedings are
brought against buyers as well as sellers so that both are required to respect
the act's prohibitions.2"
18

Section 2(b) of the act provides:
(b) Upon proof being made, at any hearing on a complaint under thiz zection,
that there has been discrimination in price or services or facilities furnished, the burden of rebutting the prima-facie case thus made by showing justification shalr be upon
the person charged with a violation of this section, and unless justification shall be
affirmatively shown, the Commission is authorized to issue an order terminating the
discrimination....
49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1964).
19 Section 2(f) of the act provides: "(f) It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in
commerce, in the course of such commerce, knowingly to induce or receive a discrimination in
price which is prohibited by this section." 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(f) (1964).
20 Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61 (1953).
21 National Parts Warehouse v. FTC, 346 F.2d 311 (7th Cir. 1965), affirming National
Parts Warehouse, 3 TRADE REG. REP. 1 16700 (F.T.C. Dec. 16, 1963); American Motor Specialties Co. v. FTC, 278 F.2d 225 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 884 (1960); Mid-South
Distribs. v. FTC, 287 F.2d 512 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 838 (1961); Krug v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 142 F. Supp. 230 (D.N.J. 1956).
22 Fred Meyer, Inc., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 116368 (F.T.C. March 29, 1963).
23 Forster Mfg. Co., 3 TRADE REo. REP. 17304, at 22454 (F.T.C. July 23, 1965).
16992 (F.T.C. July 22, 1964).
24 Max Factor & Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP.
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This last development may, in the long run, be the most significant of
all. Few sellers expose themselves to Robinson-Patman Act liability except at
the urging of power-conscious buyers. If it is made known to industry that it
is not more blessed to receive than to give an unlawful discrimination, the
problems of Robinson-Patman Act enforcement may be greatly simplified.
V. :Conclusion
This article should not be construed to indicate that all is well with the
Robinson-Patman Act. Certainly the rulings to date with respect to cost justification under the act leave much to be desired. The thrust of these observations
is that during recent years the act has increasingly become both reasonably
clear and more clearly reasonable.
Perhaps the author is merely stating that in the course of his day-to-day
work with the act, he has become, like Professor Higgins, "accustomed to her
face." After reviewing the bills now before Congress for amending this statute,
he is convinced that one could do far worse than accept and comply with the
act as presently interpreted than to proceed down any congressional road paved
with the current well-intentioned legislative proposals. Better the statutory ills
we have, than become seriously ill from further legislative medication.

